"We are at the dawn of a new century. Now is the moment to be farsighted as we chart a path into the new millennium." -President William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century," May 1997 "We must judge our national security strategy by its success in meeting the fundamental purposes set out in the preamble to the Constitution: '…provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity…' " -"A National Security Strategy for a New Century," October 1998
The United States' Constitution was generated with considerable difference of opinion as to how the U.S. government ought to be organized, and was the product of significant compromise.
1 The Constitution established a federal government of separate institutions sharing powers-a system of checks and balances that throughout U.S. history, has fostered tension among these branches of government. Yet, in order to effect policy for U.S. national interests, this form of government has also required a mix of cooperation and compromise among the branches. The National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Plan 2 is likewise the product of significant coordination and compromise among the branches of government, as well as numerous industry players and the American people. 1 Collier, Christopher, and James L. Collier, Decision In Philadelphia: The Constitutional Convention of 1787 , (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1986 ): x. 2 The National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Plan is a requirement of Presidential Decision Directive 63 (Protecting America's Critical Infrastructures), and will be published in two parts. Part I, the National Plan for Information Systems Protection, will be published in January 2000. Part II, the Critical Physical Infrastructure Protection Program, will be published at a time to be determined. Clinton issued PDD-39. This directive was geared toward preventing domestic terrorism, and directed the Attorney General to lead a government-wide effort to re-examine the adequacy of our infrastructure protection. 5 The Attorney General's review highlighted vulnerabilities of America's physical infrastructures and significant gaps in protection of our cyber infrastructure: critical information systems and computer networks.
In a separate initiative, the National Security Advisor led an interagency working group (including DOD, DOJ, and DCI) to examine critical infrastructure vulnerabilities. The PCCIP was chartered to assess the scope and nature of the threats, identify legal and policy issues, recommend a comprehensive national policy and implementation strategy, and propose any necessary statutory or regulatory changes.
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The PCCIP consisted of representatives and experts from the various infrastructures' industries, as well as from corresponding departments of government. The
Commissioners spent 15 months on the problem, and on 20 October 1997, released their report. The PCCIP concluded that our nation is so dependent on our infrastructures that we must view them through a national security lens. They are essential to the nation's security, economic health, and social well being. 
Controlling Authorities
Deciding where and how to proceed on this CIP problem requires consideration and integration of several controlling authorities: Constitutional constraints, domestic and international law, existing policies, precedent and conventions, and public support.
Per the U.S. Constitution, the federal government shall provide for the common defense, and as specified in Article IV, Section 4, shall protect each state against invasion. 13 Counterbalancing the Constitutional authority to protect American national security interests is the moral imperative to protect U.S. citizens from intrusive government interference. Detection of potential CIP attacks requires viable intelligence activity, which may violate certain rights to privacy and civil liberties. Amendment IV protects US citizens from illegal search, and as such protects each citizen's right to privacy:
"The right to be left alone-the most comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment." 14 Further, this right to privacy extends beyond U.S. citizenry. Per Article 12 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 12 "Many have pointed out the need for government-industry partnership, which I endorse. But it must be a carefully articulated partnership, which will enable industry to know what it is being asked to do and why. To call for more cooperation in a policy vacuum is meaningless and useless." Additionally, the United States' encryption policy lacks some coherency. The U.S.
intelligence community maintains the stance that encryption technology should be deliberately controlled and kept to a level that they can monitor for the sake of keeping tabs on the criminal element. However, the criminals have already shown a propensity to break the law, and the more complex encryption algorithms can already be relatively easily procured, albeit illegally. The U.S. encryption policy has an adverse impact exclusively on the law-abiding segment, by precluding them from using the best tools available to secure their information systems.
Similar to the lack of policy on CIP, there is also little precedent to deal with protecting critical infrastructures, especially in the information realm. While there is some legal basis for enforcing physical protection of critical infrastructures, the rapid emergence of the cyber threat has left all branches and agencies of the federal government far behind.
While the FBI has set up the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), this entity is tasked to detect and track computer intrusions/attacks. The priority for U.S. CIP should be to develop a defense in depth, to prevent, or at least significantly blunt the effects of a cyber attack on American critical infrastructures.
At the state and local levels, the vulnerabilities of our critical infrastructures seem widely recognized, but the threat is only minimally addressed. For example, states and municipalities nationwide have mobilized Y2K crisis watch centers to address potential problems with the critical infrastructures-whether brought on by Y2K anomalies or terrorist cyberattacks. Unfortunately, many of these centers will quickly disband after the New Year with little thought of quick reconstitution capability, even though the many potential threats to critical infrastructures remain.
Finally, public support is mixed. Most agree that the U.S. government should provide for the common defense, but blanch at the perception that in providing for cyber security, the government would trample citizens' rights to privacy. Further, many either don't recognize the extent of the threat, or believe that this is a problem that the private sector should solve unilaterally. In business circles, there is fear that if the government 17 There is also the risk of losing competitive edge through the release of proprietary information.
The Decision-Makers and Other Participants
The Executive Branch has taken the lead for the government in protecting critical infrastructures. This is largely due to the organization of the Executive Branch, which contains the various departments and agencies that are directly influenced by policy on CIP. The President serves as the focal point for such policy, and is also responsible for coordinating agreements with foreign countries. The President has also stated the position, both in PDD-63 and in the National Plan for Critical Information Systems Protection, that the CIP solution exists absolutely in a cooperative arrangement between government and the private sector. Further, the government will rely on such cooperative solutions and not on government regulations or enforced industry standards.
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The Legislative Branch will also have a significant role in the CIP program.
Inasmuch as the Executive Branch needs to cooperate with the private sector, the Executive and Legislative Branches need to work together for CIP. Legislation may be required to add caveats to the FOIA, in order to address propriety and competitive concerns, and encourage industry partners to share information on critical infrastructure Cooperation between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches will be required to address the subject of tracking through cyber space and apprehending cybercriminals. This issue must address rules of surveillance and problems of jurisdiction that arise as the cybercrook transits several jurisdictional zones while engaged in an attack within the cybersphere, and must be carefully handled to ensure protection of citizens' civil liberties. Note that the capture of a cyber criminal is secondary to the primary objective:
assuring a solid defense of our information systems from even an initial attack.
Numerous entities in the private sector will play a very large role in the solution to this CIP problem. on both sides is essential, in order for government to provide the essential CIP services while assuring protection of individual privacy and civil liberties, and for the private sector to share the information essential to good threat analysis.
Action Required
Technological and economic progress provides tremendous benefits to society, but also causes friction and conflict. As societies grow and interact, violence becomes increasingly a method of human reaction. The threat to American infrastructures and the American way of life is very real. The capacity for devastating violent action has devolved from the State entities to the individual-technology has made it so. Attacks to our networks and critical infrastructures are becoming more and more common, in the form of terrorism and information warfare. Limited forms of conflict no longer mean limited aims;
this shift in the paradigm of conflict indicates that the issue can no longer be left to the State to maintain threat awareness, plan for, or defend against. It is an issue that has become the responsibility of all people. 20 Clearly, an effective CIP program will require cooperation and a certain level of compromise among all the players-all branches of government, the private sector, and the American people. The threat is real, and the threat demands it.
